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The empirical literature on the theory and practice of sentencing politically motivated
offenders such as terrorists in U.S. federal courts is limited. Thus, we know relatively little
about the dealings between terrorist offenders and the criminal justice system or how these
interactions may be influenced by changes in American legal or political context. This
study summarizes previous findings relative to sentencing disparity among terrorists and
nonterrorists in U.S. federal courts prior to the imposition of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. We then identify events occurring after the advent of the guidelines, including
the early acts of terrorism on American soil. We evaluate the sentencing of terrorists versus
nonterrorists following the confluence imposition of the guidelines and these events. We
determine whether and how the sentencing disparity between terrorist and nonterrorist has
changed since the implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the terrorist events
of the early 1990s. Based on our findings, we put forth suggestions as to the possible ways
these conditions may have affected sentencing outcomes.
Keywords: police training; police perceptions; youth-related incidents; police work; law
enforcement
Introduction
Investigations of interactions between justice agencies and terrorists may often be hin-
dered by political, legal, practical, and public safety concerns. As a result, research on
this issue is often limited by the unavailability of data. Thus, although the growing body
of literature on terrorism investigates patterns of global terrorism (e.g., LaFree, Morris,
Dugan, & Fahey, 2006), terrorist networks (e.g., Asal, Nussbaum, & Harrington, 2007),
media coverage (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006), and societal responses to terrorism
(e.g., McCauley, 2006), relatively less attention has centered on correlates of punishment
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of convicted terrorists. In a notable exception, the U.S. Sentencing Commission did provide
sufficiently detailed records involving defendants in terrorism trials during the 1980s that
allowed researchers to derive a comparative sample of terrorists and nonterrorists convicted
of the same lead offenses during the presentencing guidelines era. These results were
reported in a series of articles (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998).
This research revealed at least three important findings. First, terrorists received substan-
tially longer sentences than similarly situated nonterrorists. Smith (1994) and Smith and
Damphousse (1996) found that for terrorists, governmental response is significantly more
severe and uncompromising than for traditional federal offenders convicted of similar fed-
eral crimes. Terrorist sentences during the study era (1980–1987) were, on average, about
4½ times longer than those for nonterrorists matched by year and primary offense code.
Second, they found that political motive—whether the polity ‘‘labeled’’ the offender as a
terrorist or not—was the best predictor of sentence length, despite controls for numerous
demographic variables, offense severity, and disposition.
Finally, Smith and Damphousse (1998) found that the ability to predict the sentences of
terrorists appeared to be substantially better than the ability to predict the sentences of non-
terrorists. Explained variance was approximately four times higher among a terrorist sam-
ple than among a matched nonterrorist sample using the same predictor variables.
Furthermore, they found that the level of explained variance was highest under conditions
reflective of Hagan’s (1989a) structural-contextual theory and the ‘‘liberation hypothesis,’’
that is, under conditions of a proactive political environment (as in terrorism) and where
crime severity was ‘‘high’’ (Smith & Damphousse, 1998, p. 81).
Whether these findings remain relevant, however, is questionable. While the 1998 article
found support for both structural-contextual theory and the liberation hypothesis, it is
not known whether these models remain useful predictors. The findings may be mere
artifacts—relevant only in the presentence guidelines era. The criminal justice processes
that lead to sentencing outcomes for terrorists are not static. In the current study, we hope
our re-examination of prior research questions can provide new insight into criminal justice
responses to terrorism in light of historical and legal events.
Literature Review
Currently, we do not know whether and/or how the sentencing of terrorists may have
changed since earlier studies during the preguidelines era. In addition, we do not know
whether the variables that explained sentence disparity between terrorists and nonterrorist
in the presentence guidelines era remain the same or have become more or less important as
a result of implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines. Perhaps more importantly,
the effect of the confluent implementation of the federal guidelines and the public’s emer-
gent fear of extremism following the terrorist attacks of the 1990s suggest that the previ-
ously found sentencing disparities between convicted terrorists and their nonterrorist
counterparts may have substantially changed. That is, although earlier studies did provide
information on the sentencing of terrorists then, the sentencing patterns of terrorists versus
nonterrorists may be very different now.
Thus, although previous research found significant disparity in the punishment of terror-
ists and similarly situated nonterrorists convicted during the 1980s (Smith & Damphousse,
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1996, 1998), the implementation of the federal guidelines in the context of a number of sig-
nificant events in the 1990s warrant a re-examination of these issues. First, concern over
sentencing disparity in federal criminal cases led to passage of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 and subsequent implementation of federal sentencing guidelines in the late 1980s
(Albonetti, 1997, 1998). Although these reforms had several goals, including but not lim-
ited to, serving the just desserts philosophy and management of prison populations (Hofer,
Blackwell, & Ruback, 1999), the primary goal of the sentencing guidelines was the reduc-
tion of unwarranted disparity. While the definition of ‘‘unwarranted’’ disparity has been
debated, the 1990s was a watershed era during which guidelines were critiqued, modified,
and ultimately tested to determine whether this goal was being met (Albonetti, 1997; Bureau
of Justice Assistance, 1996; Kempf-Leonard & Sample, 2001; Koons-Witt, 2002; McDonald
& Carlson, 1993; Mustard, 2001; Nagel & Johnson, 1994; Rhodes, 1991; Spohn, 2005; U.S.
Sentencing Commission [USSC], 1991; see Spohn, 2000, for an excellent review).
In addition, the 1990s was a period when state and federal legislatures were modifying
the application principles of American criminal law. Motive, generally considered irrele-
vant as an essential element in criminal law except to help establish intent (LaFave, Wayne
& Scott, 1986), emerged as a new criminal justice tool that could be used to determine sen-
tencing. Expression of this change is seen in the advent of hate crime legislation that pro-
vided prosecutors the opportunity to seek longer sentences based on the motivation for the
attack (Colomb & Damphousse, 2004; Jacobs & Potter, 1998).1
Moreover, terrorism, the ultimate expression of politically motivated crime, thrust itself
into American consciousness during that decade. Although America had experienced its
share of terrorism in previous decades (Smith, 1994), Americans generally felt insulated
from the effects of terrorism, at least in comparison to its European neighbors. Although
the effect of the September 11, 2001, attacks awakened many Americans to the danger
of Islamic extremism, the psychological transition from immunity to terrorism to vulner-
ability began with the first bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993; perceptions
of vulnerability dramatically increased with the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City 2 years later (Damphousse, Hefley, & Smith, 2003). Passage of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 followed swiftly. Prior to these attacks,
there was no ‘‘public will’’ that would enable the government to create such an act. Just
as the 9/11 attacks created an atmosphere that allowed the implementation of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2002, the bombing of the WTC and the Murrah Building created a context
that allowed for major shift in investigative and prosecutorial strategies, tactics, and rules
(Damphousse & Shields, 2007). Public opinion clearly supported more severe punishment
for perpetrators of politically motivated violence as terrorism became a top concern of the
American people (Harris Interactive, 2001).
It may seem axiomatic that terrorists should be treated differently by the criminal justice
system than punished nonterrorist criminals. Closer examination, however, suggests several
problematic philosophical and complex legal issues. First, it is not clear whether a society
that prides itself on rights of free speech and assembly should be allowed to punish polit-
ically motivated bank robbers (for example) more severely than bank robbers with only
pecuniary motivation. Should the offender’s motive be allowed to significantly influence
the extent of the punishment?
The issue of punishing terrorist motivation is source of considerable debate for a number
of reasons. For one, America traditionally has avoided the concept of ‘‘political crime’’
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(Hagan, 1989a; Ingraham & Tokoro, 1969; Turk, 1982). Consequently, it has only been in
recent years that the United States has even addressed the issue of terrorism in the federal
criminal code. Although other types of criminality, such as hate crimes, now include
motive, the creation of these statutes has not been without considerable initial constitutional
debate (Grattet & Jenness, 2005, Jacobs & Henry, 1996; Jenness & Grattet, 2001). Such
debates, in addition to the inherent ambiguity in defining terrorism, inhibited the creation
of specific federal offenses called ‘‘terrorism’’ for many years—opposition to such laws
was only overcome because of increased fear of terrorism on American soil.
Second, the focus on a political motivation may hinder successful prosecution by making
criminal cases more difficult to establish and by increasing public scrutiny of the subse-
quent trials. The failure of several high-profile seditious conspiracy cases against terrorists
in the late 1980s confirmed to federal prosecutors that the most effective strategy in prose-
cuting terrorists was to treat these offenders as ‘‘common’’ criminals, rather than to expli-
citly politicize their behavior (Smith, 1994; Turk, 1979). Some have suggested that jurors
are hard-pressed to seriously consider ‘‘seditious conspiracy’’ charges against seemingly
feckless terrorist groups, and efforts to so charge these individuals may be seen as overkill
on the part of the government (Smith, Damphousse, Jackson, & Sellers, 2002). In addition,
jurors may be sympathetic toward antifederal government and antitax groups (Smith,
Damphousse, & Karlson, 2001).
Thus, the preferred strategy by prosecutors appears to have been to try terrorists more
like ‘‘traditional’’ offenders. For example, defendants are charged with bank robbery
and possession of explosive material, instead of terrorism-specific statutes (Shields,
Damphousse, & Smith, 2006). Upon conviction for ‘‘simple’’ criminal counts, prosecutors
influence judicial decision making at the sentencing phase, where uncharged and uncon-
victed conduct could be introduced.2 During sentencing hearings, the lack of jury influence,
the absence of cross-examination, and the decreased standard of proof to ‘‘preponderance
of the evidence’’ gave prosecutors the opportunity to introduce terrorist information. This
tactic resulted in federally indicted terrorists receiving sentences that were more than
three times longer than nonterrorists for the same offense (Smith & Damphousse,
1996). Prosecutors appear to have been motivated to charge terrorist offenders using
lesser statutes (which ultimately results in greater certainty of conviction and longer
sentence lengths) rather than having to obtain convictions under more serious statutes that
require a higher burden of proof during the trial phase (Smith, Damphousse, Yang, &
Ginther, 2005).
These findings suggest investigative agency priorities with regard to terrorism may sub-
vert a main goal of sentencing guidelines (i.e., reducing sentencing disparities) by differen-
tially offering incentives for cooperation. The Attorney General’s (AG) guidelines for
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) terrorism enterprise investigations, for example, call
for a focus on dismantling terrorist organizations.3 It is possible that these investigative
guidelines run counter to sentencing guideline efforts to reduce disparity for ‘‘similarly
situated defendants.’’ From April 1983 to June 2002, for example, persons investigated and
indicted as a result of a ‘‘domestic security/terrorism’’ investigation by the FBI were treated
differently from those who were investigated under a ‘‘general crimes’’ investigation.4
Investigators were instructed to focus upon ‘‘beheading’’ the terrorist group to prevent or
deter further organizational planning and growth. The AG guidelines were quite specific:
terrorism investigations are ‘‘concerned with the investigation of entire enterprises, rather
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than individual participants and specific criminal acts’’ (emphasis added; Office of the
Attorney General [OAG], 1983a, 13).
When these AG Guidelines were in effect (1983–1987), it was not uncommon for the
specific perpetrators of terrorist acts to receive lighter sentences or more desirable plea bar-
gains in exchange for testimony against group leaders (Smith, 1994; Smith & Damphousse,
1996). From all indications, the AG Guidelines were being followed in an attempt to
‘‘decapitate’’ terrorist groups active during this period. Evidence of this pattern was visible
in several ways, the most notable being (a) the disparity between the sentences of group
leaders and their subordinates and (b) the percentage of terrorists who pleaded guilty to one
or more charges in their indictments (Smith & Damphousse, 1998). It is not clear whether
sentencing guidelines affected the ability or willingness of prosecutors, for example, to
offer significant reductions in exchange for cooperation.
Federal guidelines allow for downward departures within the sentencing grid for offen-
ders that have provided substantial assistance to the prosecution. However, the changing
public sentiment may make prosecutors recommend smaller reductions for assistance from
terrorist defendants. Following the first WTC and Oklahoma City bombings, public percep-
tions of vulnerability may make jurors more willing to convict terrorists than in years past,
even in ‘‘weaker’’ cases. Prosecutors may feel more confident in taking terrorist cases to
trial and have more power during plea bargaining. Public sentiment may discourage prose-
cutors from recommending reductions for even low-level defendants, for fear of appearing
‘‘soft on terrorism.’’
Thus, our reinvestigation is warranted by a number of grounds. First, we do not know
whether and/or how the sentencing of terrorists may have changed since earlier studies dur-
ing the preguidelines era. In addition, we do not know whether the variables that explained
sentence disparity between terrorists and nonterrorists in the presentence guidelines era
remain the same or have become more or less important as a result of implementation of
the guidelines. Perhaps more importantly, the effect of the confluence of the implementa-
tion of the federal guidelines and the public’s emergent fear of extremism following the
terrorist attacks of the 1990s suggest that the previously found sentencing disparities
between convicted terrorists and their nonterrorist counterparts may have substantially
changed. That is, although earlier studies did provide information on the sentencing of terror-
ists then, the sentencing patterns of terrorists versus nonterrorists may be very different now.
Research Questions
This article informs the discussion regarding the punishment of terrorists by addressing
two main questions. These research questions lend themselves to a quasiexperimental
design where the sentences of matched samples of terrorists and nonterrorists can be exam-
ined in both the presentencing and postsentencing guidelines eras.
1. Has the disparity in sentencing among terrorists and similarly situated nonterrorists
noted in previous research (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998) changed in the postguide-
lines (and post–first WTC and Oklahoma City bombing) era?
One effect of the introduction of sentencing guidelines has been that federal defendants
have received longer sentences in the postguidelines era (Anderson, Kling, & Stith, 1999).
Therefore, we hypothesize that both federally convicted terrorists and nonterrorists would
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be more likely to receive incarceration sentences (hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 2a) as well
as longer mean sentences (hypothesis 1b and hypothesis 2b) during the postguidelines
era than in the preguidelines era. Because previous research suggested that terrorists
received sentences that were approximately 4½ times longer than the sentences given to
nonterrorists (Smith & Damphousse, 1996), we hypothesize that terrorists will continue
to receive longer sentences than nonterrorists in the postguidelines era (hypothesis 3).
Hypothesis 1a. Terrorists will be more likely to receive incarceration sentences in the post-
guidelines era than in the preguidelines era.
Hypothesis 1b. The mean sentence length for terrorists will be significantly longer in the
postguideline era than in the preguideline era.
Hypothesis 2a. Nonterrorists will be more likely to receive incarceration sentences in the
postguidelines era than in the preguidelines era.
Hypothesis 2b. The mean sentence length for nonterrorists will be significantly longer in
the postguideline era than in the preguideline era.
Hypothesis 3. Terrorists will continue to receive longer sentences than nonterrorists in the
postguidelines era.
2. Has our ability to explain the variance in these sentences improved since implemen-
tation of the sentencing guidelines?
Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti (1980) suggested that sentence outcomes can be better pre-
dicted under certain conditions or for certain crimes. Subsequent tests of this ‘‘structural-
contextual’’ approach using drug and white collar crime prosecutions revealed a decreased
disparity in sentences for offenses where the polity had concentrated its resources than was
observed for crimes that avoided such scrutiny. Hagan (1989a, b) hypothesized that studies of
‘‘general’’ federal cases (those which do not elicit intense attention) are likely to explain low
proportions of variance in sentence outcomes. ‘‘The single finding that is consistent through-
out the large research literature on judicial sentencing is thatwhether legal or extralegal factors
are the focus of analysis, the unexplained variance in sentencing looms large’’ (Hagan, 1995,
p. 143-144). This occurs because the American justice system tends to be ‘‘loosely coupled,’’
with low levels of explained variance in outcomes across subsystems (Hagan, 1989b).
However, when ‘‘political power is directed toward particular crime-linked goals,’’ the justice
system ‘‘tightens’’ through the use of ‘‘proactive techniques’’ (Hagan, 1989b, p. 118).
A more tightly coupled system results in greater cooperation and communication among
law enforcement and court officials. Certain historical contexts allow for this greater
coupling—the creation of a proactive political environment where ‘‘the surrounding polit-
ical environment has mandated departures from normal criminal justice operations . . .
[involving] the imposition of political power, sometimes targeting the prosecution of a
particular form of crime and criminal’’ (Hagan, 1989b, p. 130). Within this heightened
political environment, the level of discretion available to justice actors decreases, allowing
for increased ability of legal variables to explain sentence length variation.
Counterterrorism efforts provide an excellent example of how ‘‘proactive’’ environ-
ments can affect the operation of the criminal justice system—especially in the post-9/11
era. Terrorism investigations are not ‘‘general’’ criminal justice operations and they focus
political power on the prosecution of a specific type of offender—key characteristics of a
‘‘proactive political environment.’’ When an act is officially labeled as ‘‘terrorism’’ by the
government, proactive justice procedures are set in motion. This change increases the
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likelihood of a successful arrest and conviction of the terrorist offender—not to mention the
amount of punishment. Thus, a ‘‘tightened’’ justice system should result in greater levels of
explained variance in sentence outcomes for terrorists than for nonterrorists, controlling for
the severity of offenses.
We expect to find continued support for structural contextual theory’s argument that
crimes prosecuted in a ‘‘proactive political environment’’ will lead to ‘‘tighter coupling’’
of the justice system. Furthermore, we hypothesize that this effect will manifest itself in
greater amounts of explained variance for terrorists than for nonterrorists in the postguide-
lines era. In particular, the structural contextual model predicts that significant terrorist
events such as the 1993 WTC bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing would result in
a more proactive political environment and a resulting increase in explained variance
among terrorist cases.
Hypothesis 4. In the presentence guidelines era, explained variance in predicting sentence
length is higher among defendants in terrorism cases than among similarly situated
defendants in nonterrorism cases.
Hypothesis 5. In the postsentence guidelines era, explained variance in predicting sentence
length is higher among defendants in terrorism cases than among similarly situated
defendants in nonterrorism cases.
By systematizing sentencing decisions, the guidelines should reduce the influence of extra-
legal factors. The federal guidelines attempt to eliminate disparities across cases by making
cases more uniform and therefore predictable. This implies that there should be less variation
in outcomes for all similarly situated defendants; by reducing the total amount of variation
to be explained, models in the postguidelines era should explain a higher proportion of the
variation in sentencing outcomes. Thus, for both terrorism and nonterrorism cases, we
hypothesize that explained variance would have increased in the postsentence guidelines era.
Hypothesis 6. When comparing presentence and postsentence guidelines terrorism cases,
explained variance should be greater in postsentence guidelines cases.
Hypothesis 7. When comparing presentence and postsentence guidelines nonterrorism
cases, explained variance should be greater in postsentence guidelines cases.
These hypotheses are tested by comparing the explained variance between presentence
and postsentence guidelines terrorism cases and the explained variance between presen-
tence and postsentence guidelines nonterrorism cases.
More importantly, we examine the impact of the guidelines on sentence disparities
between terrorists and nonterrorists. The postguidelines era follows the co-occurrence of
events that can increase disparity with those aimed to reduce disparity. Thus, one may rea-
sonably expect either of these outcomes. In the following paragraphs, we put forth both
competing hypotheses. We then discuss how each of these findings suggests different
potential underlying justice processes.
Events such as the first WTC bombing and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City could have resulted in considerable public pressure to investigate, pro-
secute, and punish these types of offenders very harshly (Hagan, 1989b). Other scholars
(e.g., Chermak, 2002) make similar contentions with reference to the impact of the Okla-
homa City bombing on federal ‘‘sweeps’’ of the militia movement. Consistent with the
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structural contextual perspective, these events may have prompted a ‘‘tight coupling’’ of the
criminal justice system (Hagan, 1989b).
During this increased coordination, prosecutors may better communicate their eviden-
tiary needs to law enforcement and investigators, these agencies may be more motivated
to meet AG needs, judges may be more easily persuaded to authorize warrants, and so
on. This ‘‘tight coupling’’ could strengthen the quality and quantity of evidence in terrorism
cases. It is also likely that those investigators and law enforcement agencies, in reward for
their efforts, would expect prosecutors to seek more severe sentences of convicted offen-
ders. The expectation of fellow criminal justice agents, combined with the increased
strength of evidence, dissuades prosecutors from negotiating reduced sentences. Thus, the
position that sentence disparity between terrorists and nonterrorists would have increased in
the postsentencing guidelines era would appear to be justified.
One of the goals of guidelines, however, was to eliminate such disparities across simi-
larly situated defendants. By this notion, we predict that the advent of guidelines resulted
in decreased amounts of the judicial discretion that may have explained previous disparities
(Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998). It is reasonable to expect the impact of the federal sen-
tencing guidelines on disparity among similarly situated defendants to mitigate the effects
of historical events such as the Oklahoma City bombing.
Hypothesis 8. The sentencing disparity between terrorist and nonterrorists will be smaller in
the postguideline era than it was in the preguideline era.
Testing of the hypotheses requires the implementation of a quasiexperimental design that
uses both pretest and posttest groups and comparison or control groups.
Method
Data for this project were extracted from two main sources. The terrorists in our study
were drawn from the American Terrorism Study (ATS).5 This study tracks the federal crim-
inal cases of persons indicted as the result of an official FBI investigation opened as part of
‘‘intelligence investigation for terrorism-related activities,’’ as distinguished from a ‘‘gen-
eral crimes’’ investigation under the AG Guidelines. The ATS database includes informa-
tion on over 500 terrorists from about 65 terrorist groups. These persons were indicted for
approximately 7,000 violations of federal criminal law from 1980 to 2002. Data on each
case were extracted from the federal criminal case files at either the district court where the
case was tried or the regional federal records facility where the case has been archived.
Data for each terrorist were supplemented with sentence specific information provided
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Each terrorist was matched with a sample
of ‘‘traditional’’ offenders extracted from the Federal Judicial Center’s Federal Court
Cases: Integrated Data Base.
Sample Selection
The terrorists in the ATS database were divided into presentencing guidelines and post-
sentencing guidelines cases. Of the 213 terrorists who were indicted during the preguideline
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time period, 129 were convicted. Complete data were available on 111 convicted terrorists
and 482 convicted nonterrorists. Results from analyses of these samples have been previ-
ously reported elsewhere (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998).
Terrorists and nonterrorists were matched by year of indictment and offense code. Then
a random sample of nonterrorists within year and offense code categories was selected via a
random numbers table. The matched sample of nonterrorists uses a 5:1 ratio; that is, for
each terrorist convicted of A.O Code 7611 (kidnapping, hostage), 5 nonterrorists convicted
of the same lead offense the same year were randomly selected for inclusion.
One important change that was implemented under the federal sentencing guidelines is a
mandate that felons serve a substantial portion of their sentence. These changes prevent
a simple comparison of ‘‘time served’’ in the preguidelines and postguidelines eras as
an indicator of changes in severity or disparity. Consequently, a comparative sample of
‘‘similarly situated’’ defendants convicted in the postsentencing guidelines era was
required. Supplemental information on each of the terrorists convicted during the post-
guidelines era (1988–1998) was obtained from the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The basic
sample selection process used with the preguidelines data was repeated for these cases with
one modification. While terrorists charged in the preguidelines era were matched by year
of indictment, terrorists in the postsentencing guidelines era were matched by year of con-
viction. This was necessitated by changes in USSC coding strategies. Complete data are
available for 83 terrorists convicted during the postguideline era and 518 nonterrorists who
were convicted of similar offenses in federal courts from 1988 through 1998.
Measures
Our models measure sentencing severity using two dependent variables. Consistent with
previous research (e.g., see Kurlychek & Johnson, 2004; Spohn &Holleran, 2000; Steffens-
meier et al., 1998; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996), we model both the
likelihood of receiving incarceration and the length of incarceration. The first outcome is
measured by the dichotomous variable incarceration, indicating whether the defendant
received a sentence of incarceration. Those who received an incarceration sentence were
scored as 1 (0¼ not incarcerated, 1¼ incarcerated). The second dependent variable, sentence
length, reflects the length of incarceration as measured in months, ranging from 0 to 756.
Recent research has questioned the use of the total incarceration variable, finding empiri-
cal support for differentiating between prison and jail sentences (Holleran & Spohn, 2004).
Unfortunately, the incarceration length variable in the ATS database does not distinguish
between jail and prison incarceration. We applied the same approach to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission data for consistency across databases. Frequency diagnostics suggest, how-
ever, that this approach may be less problematic in our current models. Over 83% of cases
in which incarceration was ordered received sentences over 1 year. Thus, it seems likely
that most of these sentences were served in a prison setting, rather than a jail setting (which
is usually reserved for shorter periods of confinement). This finding suggests that our data
probably contain relatively few of the short-term jail inmates that make the use of the total
incarceration variable questionable.
As is typical with much of criminological outcomes, the distribution of the sentence
length variable is skewed (e.g., Osgood, Finken, & McMorris, 2002). Thus, we conducted
our analyses using both sentence length and the natural logarithm of the sentence length
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(Bushway & Piehl, 2001; Osgood & Rowe, 1994). This also allows us to discuss findings in
terms of the percentage change of the dependent variable. Thus, our analyses recognize that
the impact of increasing a sentence by a few months is relative to the base sentence length.
That is, adding 2 or 3 months to a 3-month sentence can effectively double sentence length
but may be much less meaningful for longer sentences (Kurlychek & Johnson, 2004; Sellin
& Wolfgang, 1964; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006).
We created two dummy dichotomous (0/1) variables as key independent variables. The
dummy variable terrorist differentiates between those indicted as a result of a terrorism
investigation (coded as 1) and those in our matched nonterrorist sample. The dummy vari-
able postguideline differentiates between cases taking place prior to federal sentence guide-
lines implementation and those taking place afterward (1 ¼ postguideline status).
Aggregation of cases into two eras provides a sufficient number of cases in each era for
multivariate analyses.
Consistent with prior research, our analyses included individual demographic variables
as well as case-related variables as control variables. Trial conviction is coded as a dummy
variable, such that those who pleaded guilty were coded 0, while those who were convicted
as the result of a trial were coded 1. Federal sentencing data, however, also provide an inter-
mediate category known as ‘‘initial plea-not guilty, final plea-guilty.’’ To be consistent with
previous research, the middle category was combined with ‘‘initial plea-guilty’’ to create
the dummy variable. Crime severity reflects a combined ranking of maximum punishments
available as indicated by the Federal Criminal Code and Rules, 1993 and The National
Survey of Crime Severity (NSCS; Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracey, & Singer, 1985).6 For the preg-
uidelines data, we removed ‘‘treason/sedition’’ and ‘‘national defense’’ categories from the
severity variable (there were no matches in nonterrorist data). There were no ‘‘treason/
sedition’’ or ‘‘national defense’’ cases in the postguidelines data. For both the preguideline
and postguideline cases, we created a crime severity scale, ranking severity from 1 (least
severe) to 31 (most severe), consistent with NSCS rankings (Wolfgang et al., 1985).
Some may contend that a more accurate assessment of crime severity is the indicator of
seriousness formulated in the sentencing guidelines (i.e., Offense Gravity Score [OGS]).
However, because the OGS is a product of the sentencing guidelines, it did not exist in the
preguidelines era. A pre versus post comparison necessitates including the same variables
in all models. Because this variable is only available in the postguideline sample, it seems
illogical if not empirically unsound to include them in the postmodels and then make a pre
versus post conclusion. Rather, we more appropriately include a measure of offense sever-
ity consistently calculated across both eras. Admittedly, this measure is not perfect
(although it is vetted in the literature); it is nonetheless the same across both models—thus
whatever flaws it may have are the same in both models as well.
The exogenous variables of race, gender, education, and age are included as indicators of
extralegal predictors of sentence length. In the following analyses, race is coded as a
dummy variable (1 ¼ non-white). Gender is dummy coded (1 ¼ male). Education is coded
on a scale ranging from 1 (less than eighth grade) to 6 (bachelor’s degree or higher).
Although these variables were included as controls, other important potential variables
(such as prior record) are not available in ATS data and thus not included in our analyses.
For example, prior research has debated the use of prior record scores and presumptive
sentence recommendation on modeling sentencing outcomes (Engen & Gainey, 2000).
Unfortunately, our preguideline data did not have any information regarding prior record,
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as is typically available in sentencing research. Because our primary focus is on preguide-
line and postguideline comparisons, we could not include this variable in our models. How-
ever, pre versus post guideline comparisons necessitate including the same variables in all
models. Variables such as prior record score, OGS, and presumptive sentence were created
by the federal guidelines and, therefore, did not exist prior to the imposition of the federal
guidelines. Because these variables are only available in the postguideline sample, it seems
illogical if not empirically questionable to include them in the postmodels.
Prior research has revealed jurisdictional variation on sentencing outcomes (e.g., see
Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). However, in the postguidelines era, the relatively
few terrorism cases and the limited distribution of terrorism cases across districts limited
our power to detect meaningful variation across districts. As the bulk of the cases were
in a limited number of districts, there was not sufficient jurisdiction variation to warrant
these comparisons. Moreover, the preguideline data does not include information regarding
the district in which the offender was convicted. Thus, we did not include jurisdiction infor-
mation in the current study.
Analyses presented are listwise deleted. Three variables had high numbers of missing
cases: mode of conviction (20%), education (18%), and race (12%). Although not Missing
Completely At Random (MCAR), cases seem Missing At Random (MAR). That is, they
tend be missing primarily among terrorists (all missing mode of conviction cases are from
the terrorist sample). We created ‘‘missing’’ variables for education, mode of conviction,
and race. Supplemental regression analyses showed that the missing cases tended to be
MAR in the terrorist sample. We opted to drop rather than impute cases for multivariate
analyses, as imputation can distort association coefficients and correlation relating vari-
ables (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 1982; Schafer, 1997). Regression analyses, available on request,
show that, among terrorists, cases with missing data are not significantly different from
those without missing data. The listwise deletionmodel was also the best fit. We acknowledge
that this technique, like all missing data strategies, is not without limitations (Allison, 2003).
Furthermore, although conducting analyses with omitted variables limits our ability to
assess every possible influence, the effect of guideline-specific variables should be sub-
sumed by the inclusion of the guideline variable. Acknowledging the limitations of
underspecified models, these omissions should not hinder accomplishing our primary
objective assessing change in disparity between terrorists and nonterrorists over time. That
is, rather than predicting sentencing specifically, our goal is to examine the sentencing dif-
ferential between similar groups over time, focusing on the interaction effect between time
and terrorist label. Underspecified models can be problematic in the event of spuriousness
or interaction effects between predictors and the missing variables over time, yet there is no
prior evidence to suggest this is the case. For example, for the omitted variable of prior
record, the effect of time and terrorist status would have to both interact with prior record
for this omission to be substantially problematic for our analyses. We would have to
believe: terrorists in the postguideline era have different prior records than nonterrorists,
preguideline terrorists have different prior records than postguideline terrorists, or both the
influence of prior record is different between terrorists and nonterrorists and the amount of
this difference in impact between terrorists and nonterrorist changes across guideline eras.
To date, we have found no empirical research suggesting these things.
Moreover, our four comparison subsamples (preguideline terrorists, postguidelines ter-
rorists, preguideline nonterrorists, and postguideline nonterrorists) are essentially the same
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with regard to gender, crime severity, and so on (particularly comparing terrorist defendants
across eras or comparing nonterrorist defendants across eras). One of the advantages of the
matched sample design is the reduced likelihood that the comparison groups will differ sub-
stantially in unmeasured characteristics. This suggests an omitted variable, although not
ideal, is not overly problematic. Any bias due to the omission of such variables as prior
record score should be constant. Terrorist demographics did not substantially vary across
eras. There has been no empirical study nor theoretical model put forth to suggest that the
samples would be essentially the same in all other ways but differ in regard to any of the
potential unspecified variables present in the literature. Furthermore, although our data
do have limitations, we know of no other available database with more detail regarding the
prosecution and sentencing of federal terrorist cases than the one currently used.
Finally, it is also important to note that we are comparing cases that were identified by
the FBI as terrorism cases with similar nonterrorism federal cases. The data do not include
terrorism incidents that did not come to the attention of the FBI or those federal cases that
included political motivations but did not fall into the FBI’s definition of terrorism (e.g., the
Unabomber case). The ATS has relied on the same FBI definition of terrorism for over 20
years but we recognize we are indeed relying on the FBI to identify which cases are terror-
ism cases. Still, the data allow us to compare cases that were ‘‘labeled’’ as terrorism cases
by the federal government with those that were not so labeled.
Findings
Table 1 presents the descriptive analyses for both the terrorist and nonterrorist samples.
Consistent with prior studies, the information reported in Table 1 suggests that terrorists
and nonterrorists are relatively similar in a number of ways. Both groups are predominantly
White and male, with comparable crime severity scores. The similarity between the groups
is not surprising, due to the matching technique used in sampling. We did find, however,
that federally indicted terrorists were slightly older and more educated relative to their simi-
larly situated, nonterrorist counterparts. The mean age of the terrorists was approximately
39 years compared to 35 years for nonterrorists. Likewise, the mean level of education for
terrorists was 4.2, as compared to 3.8 among nonterrorists.7
Table 1 reveals major differences between the groups with regard to mode of conviction
and sentence length. Whereas trials represent just 19.2% of nonterrorist cases, over 36% of
the terrorist sample was convicted via trial. Furthermore, the average sentence length for
terrorists was over twice the mean sentence length among nonterrorists. These findings are
similar to preguidelines studies (Smith, 1994; Smith & Damphousse, 1996).
Examining preguideline era data, we found that 80% of convicted terrorists received
incarceration, compared to 64% of preguideline nonterrorists. Following the imposition
of the guidelines, however, the frequency of incarceration sentences increased substantially
across both groups. In the postguideline era, all convicted terrorists and 82% of nonterror-
ists received incarceration.
Table 1 also shows the output from t test comparisons of mean sentence length for both
groups before and after the imposition of sentencing guidelines to assess hypothesis 1
through hypothesis 3. We observed that, on average, nonterrorists received significantly
longer sentences in the postguideline era than they had received previously. However,
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although terrorists received longer sentences than nonterrorists in both eras, average sen-
tence length among terrorists significantly decreased in the postguideline era.
To more fully test hypothesis 3 and our remaining hypotheses, subsequent analyses
incorporate these potential influences. Furthermore, we logged sentence length in all the
analyses that follow to accommodate the skew of the dependent variable. The mean for
logged sentence length among terrorists was 4.25, with a standard deviation of 1.31. The
mean logged sentence length among nonterrorists was 3.53, with a standard deviation of
1.26. Thus, logging sentence length considerably normalizes the distribution.8
To determine whether the predictors of sentence length had significantly changed with
the implementation of the sentencing guidelines, we partitioned the data by terrorist status
and guideline status. That is, we ran linear regression techniques, running separate models
for preguideline and postguideline terrorists and nonterrorists. To make appropriate across-
group comparisons, we calculated z tests, consistent with Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle,
and Piquero (1998), for testing the equality of coefficients across models. The results of
these analyses are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 suggests that the predictors of sentence length have changed little for both
terrorists and nonterrorists following the imposition of the guidelines. Specifically, among
terrorists, crime severity and trial conviction remained significant predictors of sentence
Table 1
Descriptive Statisticsa
Categories
Nonterrorists,
n ¼ 1,000
(481 preguideline)
Terrorists,
n ¼ 194
(108 preguideline)
Independent variables
Age (years) Mean 34.99 38.69
Sex Male 863 (86.3%) 174 (89.7%)
Female 95 (9.5%) 20 (10.3%)
Unknown 42 (4.2%) 0
Race Non-White 224 (22.4%) 22 (11.3%)
White 654 (65.4%) 156 (80.4%)
Unknown 122 (12.2%) 16 (8.2%)
Education Mean (range 1–6) 3.77 4.24
Crime severity Mean (range 1–31) 15.16 15.66
Trial conviction Trial 192 (19.2%) 71 (36.6%)
Guilty plea 588 (58.8%) 102 (52.6%)
Unknown 220 (22%) 21 (10.8%)
Postguideline status Preguideline 482 (48.2%) 111 (57.2%)
Postguideline 518 (51.8%) 83 (42.8%)
Dependent variables
Incarceration Preguideline 308 (64.0%) 86 (79.6%)
Postguideline 424 (81.7%) 83 (100%)
Sentence length (months) Mean (range 0–756) 47.05 130.13
Preguideline 40.9** 150.4*
Postguideline 52.8 104.3
a Percentages shown are valid percentages to accommodate cases with missing variables. Thus, they may not
add up to 100%.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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length; similarly, those variables that were nonsignificant in the preguidelines era remained
nonsignificant. With the exception of crime severity, this pattern was repeated for nonter-
rorists as well. While the significance of crime severity changed for nonterrorists between
the two eras, the z test suggests that there was no significant change in the size of the coef-
ficient. It seems the factors that predict sentence length in the preguidelines era have con-
tinued to remain important influences since the implementation of the guidelines.
Hypothesis 4 through hypothesis 7 related to differences in the explained variance of the
models between both terrorists and nonterrorists across guideline eras. In supplemental
analyses (not shown), we tested models using the same individual and case-related predic-
tors for terrorists and nonterrorists separately—both before and after the guidelines.9 Thus,
Table 2 also shows the explained variance across all four models.
The analyses confirm that our ability to predict sentence length is substantially higher
among terrorists than nonterrorists in both eras. Our comparisons among nonterrorists,
however, are revealing. We find that although our ability to predict sentence length for non-
terrorists was relatively low in the preguideline era (R2¼ .094), our explained variance sub-
stantially improved after the imposition of the sentencing guidelines. Our postguideline
model explained 23.6% of the variation in logged sentence length. Among terrorists, the
increase was more modest; our model explained 50% of the variance in the postguideline
era, as compared to 42% of the variance in the preguideline era.
Our next task was to determine whether disparity associated with the ‘‘terrorist’’ label
changed across guideline era, using logistic regression models predicting incarceration
sentences and linear regression models of logged sentence length. Admittedly, predicting
sentence length among convicted offenders brings up issues of selection bias, as we do
not have a sample of all individuals who could potentially receive sentences (Bushway,
Johnson, & Slocum, 2007; Winship & Mare, 1992). Indeed, nearly 20% of our sample did
not receive incarceration sentences. For this reason, we ran separate models (not shown)
including the conventional Heckman two-step correction for selection bias. Models that did
include a hazard rate (see Berk, 1983; Peterson & Hagan, 1984) did not substantively differ
from those shown.
Table 3 presents models of both sentencing outcomes on our predictors. Specifically,
Models 1 and 2 include the individual and case-related variables consistent with prior sen-
tencing research while Models 3 and 4 focus specifically on our predictors of interest, ter-
rorist status and guideline era. First, our analyses reveal that, across models, sex, education,
severity, and mode of conviction remained significant predictors of receiving incarceration.
We focus on the predictors of incarceration for Model 4 to calculate predicted probabilities.
Importantly, the terrorist label is associated with a 13% increase in the odds of receiving a
sentence of incarceration. Among guilty pleas of defendants of average age, education, and
crime severity, nonterrorists before the guidelines had a .52 predicted probability of receiv-
ing incarceration, compared to a .86 predicted probability after the guidelines. Similarly
situated terrorists had 76% probability of incarceration before the guidelines; all terrorists
were incarcerated during the postguidelines era. Overall, offenders during the postguide-
lines era had a 96% probability of receiving incarceration. Our findings provide support for
hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 2a.
In Models 1 and 2, we find that race and sex remain important predictors of sentence
length across models. These effects remain, even after controlling for case-related predic-
tors. Furthermore, we find that mode of conviction and crime severity are important
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influences on sentence length. As noted in Model 2, a 1-point increase in crime severity
corresponds with a 3% increase in sentence length. Notably, conviction by trial, as com-
pared to a guilty plea, increases sentence length over 80%. Moreover, these effects remain
significant and strong across models and controlling for other factors.
In Models 3 and 4, we explore the influence of terrorist status and the impact of the
guidelines on sentence length. In both models, terrorists receive significantly longer sen-
tences than nonterrorists, after controlling for other individual and case-related factors
(demographics, crime severity, and mode of conviction). For example, Model 3 shows that
terrorists received, on average, sentence lengths that are approximately 65% longer than
similarly situated nonterrorists. Furthermore, Model 3 reveals that offenders sentenced in
the postguideline era received 50% longer sentences than those sentenced previously. This
finding lends considerable support to hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that the sentencing guidelines would moderate the relationship
between terrorist status and sentence length. In Model 4, we examine the impact of the sen-
tencing guidelines on the sentencing differential between terrorists and nonterrorists. In this
model, we see that the postguidelines and terrorist main effects continue to be positive,
while our introduced interaction effect is negative. Model 4 reveals an overall increase
in sentence length for terrorists and for all offenders during the guidelines era, providing
further support of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. However, our significant negative terrorist
by postguidelines interaction effect reveals that the impact of terrorist status on sentence
length significantly decreases after the imposition of the guidelines. Whereas terrorists sen-
tenced in the preguidelines era received sentences that were roughly twice those of
nonterrorist, terrorists sentenced in the postguidelines era received roughly 32% longer than
nonterrorists (1.06 terrorist – 0.74 terrorist  postguideline), independent of other factors.
Thus, although terrorists continue to receive longer sentences relative to nonterrorists,
the gap between these groups appears to be closing. Importantly, we find that much of the
reduction in disparities may be due to significant increases in sentence lengths for nonter-
rorists rather than large changes for terrorists. Nonterrorists received 76% longer sentences
after the imposition of guidelines; terrorists received 2% longer sentences in the postguide-
line era (0.76 main effect, –0.74 interaction effect).
Discussion
Although our findings are generally consistent with our hypotheses, there were some
important surprises. Predictors of sentence length did not change appreciably following
implementation of the guidelines. In addition, our ability to explain the variance in sentence
length among these two groups of offenders increased in the postguidelines era, albeit the
increase was more dramatic for nonterrorists. Despite this increase in explained variance,
we continue to be able to explain over twice as much variance in sentence length for ter-
rorists than for nonterrorists. This is consistent with our predictions and structural contex-
tual theory’s notion that a ‘‘highly politicized environment’’ (like that created by terrorism)
lends itself to greater predictability in sentencing outcomes.
In the postguidelines era, we saw a decline in sentence disparity among the two groups.
Although terrorists continued to receive longer sentences than nonterrorists in the postgui-
delines era, the difference in their average sentence lengths has declined significantly.
Bradley-Engen et al / Punishing Terrorists 449
449
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016icj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Why? As judges typically (although not always) follow prosecutors’ recommendations,
changes in the size of the sentence disparity most likely speak more toward changes in pro-
secutorial strategies (Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, & Weis, 2002; Everett & Nienstedt,
1999). Collectively, the implication of our findings is that although the terrorist label still
matters (we noted a significant positive main effect), being a terrorist as opposed to non-
terrorist is less deleterious for offenders as compared to nonterrorists now than previously
(suggested by our negative interaction effect). It is possible that while prosecutors (and
judges) were more punitive toward terrorists in the prior era (although the percentage
increase is modest), they are now also even more punitive toward nonterrorists than in the
preguidelines era.
We predicted that, despite the increase in American fear of extremism, the advent of fed-
eral sentencing guidelines could have resulted in decreased amounts of the judicial discre-
tion that may have explained previous disparities (Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998) and
resulted in federally indicted terrorists and nonterrorists to be punished more similarly prior
to the guidelines. That is, the impact of the federal sentencing guidelines on disparity would
mitigate the effects of historical terrorist events. In the postguidelines era, sentences for
nonterrorists were significantly higher and thus more similar to those for terrorists. This
implies that guidelines probably did eliminate the disparity between similarly situated
offenders. This is consistent with prior examinations of sentence guideline effects and sug-
gests that those effects extend to our types of cases as well.
Importantly, nesting the imposition of the guidelines within the structural contextual per-
spective’s model of ‘‘proactive political environment’’ offers possible implications worth
future examination. We found a significant positive main effect of the guidelines, but the
size of that increase was small relative to the increase for nonterrorists. One possibility
is that rather than guidelines mitigating the effect of these events, for terrorists, these events
mitigated the effect of the guidelines. Although sentences for all offenders are longer in the
postguidelines era, the events of the WTC Bombing and Oklahoma City limited the size of
the sentence increase for terrorists by heightening the urgency for obtaining convictions and
preventing future terrorist events.
In the ‘‘proactive political environment’’ (Hagan, 1989a) following the terrorist attacks
of the 1990s, prosecutors may negotiate sentencing reductions in exchange for terrorist
defendant cooperation in larger investigations. Although the original sentence may be sub-
stantially longer than it would have been during the preguidelines era (i.e., as a product of
the guidelines), sentence reductions limit the amount of that increase for terrorists. Senten-
cing reductions may be essential to collect the evidence and testimony necessary to ‘‘decap-
itate’’ the organization and protect the public from future harm. Few comparable incentives
(reducing an initially longer sentence during the postguidelines era) may exist for nonter-
rorists. Thus, sentences increased for all offenders after the imposition of the guidelines, but
increased motivation for prosecutors to ‘‘behead organizations’’ by obtaining cooperation
from defendants may be mitigating some of the overall trend for terrorists.
We found significant differences across mode of conviction. Although beyond the scope
of the current study, the connection between offense severity and mode of conviction can-
not be overstated and certainly warrants further investigation. Research has suggested that
those who lose at trial are punished more severely (Johnson, 2003; Uhlman & Walker,
1979; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Zatz & Hagan, 1985). A relevant concept here is organiza-
tional efficiency (Dixon, 1995; Holmes, Hosch, Daudistel, Perez, & Graves, 1993; Uhlman
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& Walker, 1980). This perspective explains sentencing disparities across conviction mode
as the product of rewarding defendants who plead guilty and penalizing those who go to
trial. Case processing is a primary goal for courtroom work groups, and those who keep
cases moving smoothly and avoid docket backlogs by avoiding trials are rewarded. Our
findings warrant future examination of presentencing processes and the impact of disposi-
tion among terrorist and nonterrorist defendants. Although we found significant differences
across defendants after controlling for mode of conviction, comparisons across these groups
is further complicated by possible variations in the willingness to plead guilty as well as
prosecutors’ willingness to plea bargain. Terrorism cases may be particularly harder to
prove and require more time and cost to try than less politically involved cases. Conse-
quently, prosecutors may offer substantial incentives to avoid taking them to trial.
Furthermore, the court’s ability to consider ‘‘uncharged and unconvicted conduct’’ at
sentencing can have a significant impact on sentence length in terrorism cases. Prior to
1994, the guidelines did not include the possibility of enhancement for terrorism-related
offenses.10 During this time, defendants could be subject to a departure above the guideline
range for terrorism offenses. That said, upward departures were used sparingly against ter-
rorism defendants during this era.11
Conclusion
Sentence disparity between terrorists and nonterrorists has changed over time; this sug-
gests that the previously investigated processes that lead to sentencing outcomes are chang-
ing in meaningful ways. It may be that disparity across defendants may be more difficult to
ascertain, as guidelines may have shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors (Walker,
1993). Although guidelines may limit judges’ power in determining sentences, prosecutors
have considerable discretion in how cases will be charged and how guidelines may be
applied. Relevant here are the possible effects of ‘‘hidden departures’’ through ‘‘charge bar-
gaining’’ and ‘‘fact bargaining,’’ which may circumvent the guidelines.
One obvious question is whether the sentencing patterns we revealed persist subsequent
to the second WTC Bombing (9/11). The focus on terrorism brought about by the events of
9/11 may give prosecutors considerable discretion and incentive to negotiate sentence
reductions for defendants in terrorist cases not only to increase the likelihood of conviction
for terrorist leaders but also to prevent future terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, there have
been very few cases sentenced post 9/11. Future research should explore the federal prose-
cution and sentencing of politically motivated offenders as data become available.
Notes
1. Recent state laws state that the perpetrator’s act of discrimination, not hate or hate speech, is punishable.
This approach has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court (see Phillips & Grattet, 2000).
2. See, for example,McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 715
(2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1983).
3. See Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/
Terrorism Investigations (1983a) and subsequent editions in 1989 and 2002. In the case of international
terrorists, data include those persons indicted in federal courts as a result of investigation under the Attorney
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General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
(1983b) and its subsequent edition in 2002.
4. Although Attorney General John Ashcroft established new guidelines on May 30, 2002, the new guide-
lines exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the difference between ‘‘general crimes investigations’’ and ‘‘terrorism
enterprise investigations’’ (as they are now called). See The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigation, Office of the Attorney General, May 30, 2002.
5. See Smith (1994), Smith and Orvis (1993), Smith and Damphousse (1996, 1998) for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the terrorists included in this database.
6. The offense of record in the data set is the offense of which the person was convicted (as opposed to the
actual offense committed). Of course, plea bargaining often results in discrepancies between the two offenses.
The original charge of the nonterrorists in the sample is not available, so we can only rely on the offense of
conviction. This does muddy the analyses, however, because we know that terrorists are less likely to plead
guilty for reduced charges to gain attention to their cause via a public trial (Smith & Damphousse, 1998).
7. Recent research has raised the issue of censored and skewed distributions (see Kurlychek & Johnson,
2004; Osgood et al., 2002). Thus, although logging the dependent variable considerably normalized the distri-
bution, we also replicated our models using Tobit regression in Stata. The results did not differ substantively
from those shown. The results of these models are available on request.
8. The analyses are available on request. These models were run to examine difference in explained var-
iance only. The results from the terrorist  postguideline interaction model, found in Model 4 of Table 3, par-
allel these findings. This implies that a test for the equality of regression coefficients across models, such as the
Paternoster test (Paternoster et al., 1998) is not necessary.
9. See Sentencing Memorandum Opinion, CR-06-60069 et al., U.S. District Court, District of Oregon, May
21, 2007 for an excellent history of the ‘‘terrorism enhancement.’’
10. The Commentary to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (2000) specified crimes that constitute ‘‘federal
crime of terrorism’’ and conditions, where enhancement could be applied. Changes occurred after cases were
included in the data used here; thus this is less problematic for the current study. Similarly, ‘‘lag time’’ between
the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and completed prosecution of cases
suggests there are too few cases to warrant investigation of enactment impact per se.
11. See Hofer et al. (1999) for a discussion of these issues.
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